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BROWN BLUES: RETHINKING THE INTEGRATIVE IDEAL
DREW S. DAYS, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thirty-eight years have passed since the Supreme Court's Brown
v. Board of Education' decision declaring unconstitutional state-
imposed segregation of public schools. One would have thought
that by now American society would have arrived at a consensus
with respect to the substance and scope of Brown. The truth is
otherwise. Even in the education sector of our national life that
Brown specifically addressed, deep differences remain over what
changes that decision was designed to effect.
Of course, opposition to Brown by whites committed to the
maintenance of racial segregation in public education has been a
daily reality from the moment the decision was announced. Over
the years, that opposition has taken a variety of forms both simple
minded and sophisticated.3 However, it was generally thought that
one group, African-Americans, was uniformly supportive of Brown
and committed to its full implementation in education. After all,
Brown was the culmination of a long campaign by the NAACP to
overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine.4 It also ushered in,
without doubt, more than a generation of court decisions and legis-
lation that eradicated all vestiges of formal segregation in America.
Blacks seemed to agree with the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Brown that children are unlikely to function effectively in
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A., Hamilton College, 1963; L.L.B., Yale Law
School, 1966. Prior to joining the Yale faculty, the author was Assistant Attorney General
for Civil Rights from 1977-1980.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (involving desegregation in Little Rock,
Arkansas).
3. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: 1954-19?? 11-17
(1981) (discussing efforts in the South to hinder the segregation of public schools).
4. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE at x (1976).
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America's pluralistic society unless they live and learn with people
of different races from an early age.'
Several developments in recent years suggest, however, that
growing numbers of blacks may be turning away from this integra-
tive ideal. Four examples of this shift are worth noting: first, black
parents now express support for school board efforts to end deseg-
regation plans that involve busing, favoring instead a return to
neighborhood schools, even though this would result in increases in
the number of virtually all-black schools in the inner city;' second,
at the urging of black parents, school boards in a number of major
cities have attempted to create all-black male academies;7 third,
black administrators, faculty, students, and alumni of historically
black colleges in the South have joined state officials in opposition
to court-ordered higher education desegregation plans;8 and fourth,
black students. on predominantly white college campuses have
urged administrators to provide special facilities for the black stu-
dents' social and cultural events. 9 Some critics have dismissed
these developments as perverse efforts by blacks to return to a
"separate but equal" regime.' 0 In fact, these developments raise se-
rious and complex questions about the future of race relations in
America that deserve careful analysis, not simplistic characteriza-
tion. This article is an attempt to contribute constructively to that
process.
5. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ETHICAL DEMANDS FOR INTEGRATION, in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 117 (James M.
Washington ed., 1986).
6. See, e.g., Michel Marriott, Louisville Debates Plan to End Forced Grade School Bus-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at B13.
7. Dirk Johnson, Milwaukee Creating 2 Schools for Black Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1990, at 1.
8. Peter Applebome, Separate but Equal Goes Back to Court-A Special Report; Epi-
logue to Integration Fight: Blacks Favor Own Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1991, at Al.
9. Cornell: Opposition Blocks Plan to Improve Dorm Racial Mix, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1992, at 51.
10. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, Separate Schools for Male Blacks Igniting Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at Bi. Dr. Kenneth Clark, whose studies were cited by the Supreme
Court in the Brown decision for the proposition that segregation harmed black children,
called the idea of black male academies "academic child abuse." Id.
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II. BLACKS AND NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS
The school desegregation process has not been unproblematic, to
say the least. Almost forty years after Brown, there is still active
litigation alleging constitutional violations. There is no gainsaying,
however, that as a result of Brown and its progeny, thousands of
black, white, and Hispanic children have been able to receive inte-
grated educations and develop both educational and social skills
that will stand them in good stead in later life. At the very least,
the mandatory presence of white children has saved some black
and other minority children from the physically inferior facili-
ties-and inferior resources-to which they had been assigned
under segregation.
Acknowledging the important gains of desegregation, however,
should not blind us to the continuing legacy of segregation within
desegregated systems. In many schools, racially segregated classes
make it unlikely that children of different races will have meaning-
ful interaction during the school day.11 Moreover, the black com-
munity has paid, in some instances, a high price for desegregation.
For example, schools that served not only as educational institu-
tions but as community centers in predominantly black neighbor-
hoods have been closed;'" the burden of busing has fallen
disproportionately upon black children;' 3 black teachers and ad-
ministrators have been dismissed and demoted disproportion-
ately;' 4 and black students have encountered increased disciplinary
action in recently desegregated schools.15
Most important, perhaps, given the initial hope that desegrega-
tion would increase the quality of educational opportunity for
black students, is the fact that the desegregation process has not
necessarily brought about improvements. Indeed, in some cases,
desegregation has limited opportunity. For example, where magnet
schools offering innovative educational programs have replaced
11. Desegregation Under Law: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Edu-
cation Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 997, 1006 (1970) (statement of George Fischer,
President, National Education Association) [hereinafter Desegregation Under Law].
12. See Bell v. West Point Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 446 F.2d. 1362 (5th Cir. 1971).
13. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW 202-06
(1976) [hereinafter COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS].
14. Desegregation Under Law, supra note 11, at 1006-07, 1082-1144.
15. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 255-69.
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formerly all-black facilities, black student enrollment in the special
programs has been limited by the need to maintain racial bal-
ance. 6 This record establishes, contrary to common assumptions,
that desegregation has not been an unmitigated benefit to previ-
ously segregated black students, teachers, and administrators.
One need not conclude that these negative consequences are the
inevitable result of desegregation, however, and that the black
community might have been better off seeking to improve educa-
tional opportunities within a segregated system. The more plausi-
ble explanation is that the same racist tendencies in America that
created and maintained segregated schools did not disappear over-
night once desegregation was mandated. Rather, they merely found
new opportunities in this new arrangement to disadvantage the
black community.
Whatever the pros and cons of desegregation, however, the real-
ity is that demographic changes in the United States since 1954
have produced a pattern of residential segregation. 17 This makes
further progress in school desegregation in certain areas difficult to
envision. Urban centers across the nation are predominantly black
and Hispanic; the suburbs and rural areas are predominantly
white.'8 Even in those cities where the white population exceeds
the minority, the public school populations are predominantly
black and Hispanic. 9 This latter phenomenon can be explained by
the presence of childless white couples, older white couples, and
white families with children enrolled in private and parochial,
rather than public, schools.20
16. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 77 (1984).
17. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 88-
91 (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Riddick v. School Bd., 784 F.2d 521, 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
938 (1986). The court described the white flight from public schools in Norfolk: in 1970, the
population of Norfolk was 70% white, but the public school population was 57% white; in
1980, Norfolk was 61% white, but the public schools were 42.6% white; although Norfolk
was 35% black in 1980, the public school population was 58% black. Id.
20. See id. (demonstrating the tendency of whites not to enroll children in public
schools).
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Although some litigation efforts to achieve metropolitan-wide
desegregation have been successful,2 the Supreme Court's 1974 de-
cision in a Detroit school desegregation case22 effectively limited
the availability of that remedy in most urban areas. A few large
cities have adopted voluntary desegregation plans involving urban
and suburban communities, 23 but their impact upon intercity seg-
regation has been modest, largely because those participating in
such programs have been disproportionately black. The result has
been, therefore, a one-way rather than a two-way process, with ur-
ban blacks heading out to suburban schools but relatively few sub-
urban whites coming into the city.24
It is true that some predominantly black and Hispanic school
districts have been able to obtain significant resources from their
states based upon a second Supreme Court ruling involving Detroit
schools.2 5 Still, the educational experiences of many black and His-
panic students in America will occur in one-race schools in poorly
funded urban communities that have been abandoned by large
numbers of white-as well as middle-class black-families. 26 Even
in those districts where it is still possible for blacks and whites to
attend school together, some members of the black community
have begun to question whether the result achieved is worth the
time and expense that desegregation entails.
There is also a sense among some blacks that although some de-
segregation plans no longer produce meaningful numbers of whites
and blacks studying together, the plans are maintained because of
the mistaken belief that blacks cannot learn unless whites are sit-
ting next to them in class. The blacks who challenge the continua-
tion of such plans argue that a return to neighborhood school as-
signment makes more sense because parental and community
21. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) (holding that a county-
wide desegregation plan for Mobile, Alabama was a necessary remedy).
22. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 816 (1984) (discussing a voluntary plan for St. Louis and suburbs). For a discussion
of the St. Louis plan, see D. Bruce La Pierre, Voluntary Interdistrict School Desegregation
in St. Louis: The Special Master's Tale, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 971.
24. See Liddell, 731 F.2d at 1301-02.
25. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
26. See WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDER-
CLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 56-58, 102-04, 135-36 (1987).
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involvement in the schools would be more likely to increase. More-
over, government resources expended on busing could be redi-
rected to increasing the quality of materials and instruction availa-
ble at those schools.
Blacks and whites who oppose efforts to roll back desegregation
plans do so for a variety of reasons. First, they fear that such pro-
posals are yet another attempt by school boards guilty of past in-
tentional segregation to escape any further role in avoiding
resegregation. Second, they suspect blacks who support such roll-
backs of acting more in their own political and economic interests
than in the interests of black children. What roll-back proponents
seek, in fact, are more and better jobs for black administrators and
teachers in exchange for reduced pressure for increasing or main-
taining desegregation levels. Third, roll-back opponents fear that a
return to all-black schools will result in "benign neglect" of those
schools in terms of resources allocated for facilities, materials, and
personnel.
This debate, although perhaps the subject of greater media focus
in recent years, is not a new one. Blacks, having seen the bad,
along with the good, of desegregation, have for some time ques-
tioned whether the process should be extended to the limits that
the Supreme Court precedents allowed. This attitude has been
particularly prevalent with respect to desegregation plans that re-
quire extensive busing. These voices of restraint often had no ef-
fective forum, however, because they were often white school
boards correctly viewed as inherently untrustworthy spokespersons
for this point of view. The major civil rights organizations repre-
senting the plaintiffs in desegregation cases, on the other hand,
strongly reject any thought of stopping short of what the Constitu-
tion would permit.27
27. The now classic exchange between Derrick Bell and Nathaniel Jones is a telling depic-
tion of this controversy. Compare Derrick A. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (promot-
ing educational improvement rather than strict racial balancing as the means to implement
equal opportunity in education) with Nathaniel R. Jones, Letter, 86 YALE L.J. 378 (1976)
(defending as necessary the NAACP's focus on desegregation). See also GARY ORFIELD &
CAROLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNITY 105-
12 (1991) (discussing Atlanta school desegregation compromise).
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The debate has taken on a new dimension, however, because
black mayors, city council members, and school superintendents
have begun to express similar concerns about the wisdom of what
they see as "desegregation at any cost." Courts are justifiably per-
plexed over how to evaluate the views of this group, because their
authority, as elected and appointed blacks, to speak for the black
community certainly is equal to, if not greater than, that of plain-
tiffs and their lawyers in school desegregation cases. Although
some might dismiss their views as perversely malevolent toward
black students, the positions of black elected and appointed offi-
cials deserve an evaluation as expressions of concern about the
most effective approach to educating black children under daunt-
ing circumstances.
For these and other reasons, blacks increasingly support efforts
by school districts under court desegregation orders to return to
neighborhood school arrangements, even though such modifica-
tions inevitably will return certain facilities in the black commu-
nity to largely one-race status. 8 Of course, one must not lose sight
of the fact that constitutional rights are individual.2 9 Whether a
school district has satisfied its responsibility under Brown and its
progeny to dismantle a dual system is not subject to resolution by
referendum.30 The difficult legal question, one with which the Su-
preme Court continues to grapple, is how one determines whether
the dual system is still in place.31 Meanwhile, debates over modifi-
cations of desegregation plans continue.
Proponents of modification argue that once the school board has
done all it can to eradicate the vestiges of its previously dual sys-
tem, it has satisfied constitutional requirements. Continued segre-
gation, they contend, is not the school board's fault, but rather, the
consequence of residential segregation caused by private choice
28. See, e.g., Dowell v. Board of Educ., 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1513-15 (W.D. Okla. 1987)
(black minister chaired committee that proposed modification of the desegregation plan),
rev'd, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991); Riddick v. School Bd., 627
F. Supp. 814, 821 (E.D. Va. 1984) (black superintendent and three black board members,
out of seven, supported plan that would lead to a large number of identifiable black
schools), alI'd, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
29. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
30. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964).
31. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
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and market forces. Opponents of rolling back desegregation plans
argue that the school board has a duty to continue making adjust-
ments until the results of the pattern of segregation it created have
been eradicated. They take the position that demographics cited
by the board as an explanation of continued segregation are not
adventitious, but rather, the consequence of past school board
practices. Under current Supreme Court doctrines, the proponents
of modification are likely to prevail because the Court consistently
has refused to consider the extent to which segregative actions by
governmental agencies other than school boards might justify
maintenance of desegregation plans where modification would re-
sult in resegregation. Consequently, school desegregation plaintiffs
are left with a wrong in search of a remedy.2 As they witness
schools that were all-black before desegregation return to that sta-
tus once the board's modifications go into effect, it must seem to
them that years of effort have been in vain.
III. SCHOOLS FOR BLACK MALES
Media attention and public debate over the past few years have
also focused on proposals to establish public schools or programs
exclusively for black male students." In Milwaukee, for example,
the school board planned to designate two schools as all-black or
virtually all-black facilities where special attention would be given
to the educational and developmental needs of black males.34
These "immersion schools" would offer features unavailable in
other Milwaukee facilities: school days one hour longer and less
rigidly structured than normal; a multicultural curriculum; and
mandatory Saturday classes held in cooperation with the local
branch of the Urban League.3 5 Weekend sessions would focus on
nonacademic subjects such as "what it means to be a responsible
male," "how to save and invest money," and "the practicalities of
32. See Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23, 31-32 (1971). For a more complete
treatment of this issue, see Drew Days, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't
Anybody Laughing?, 95 YALE L.J. 1737 (1986).
33. Tom Dunkel, Self-Segregated Schools Seek to Build Self-Esteem, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
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cooking and cleaning." 36 The students would also be required to
wear uniforms."
As a result of actual or threatened litigation,38 Milwaukee's pro-
posal and similar ones in other urban school districts were modi-
fied to include female and white students who wished to partici-
pate. 9 The legal and political debate continues, however. At the
core of the controversy is the question of whether a school that
admits only blacks is any more constitutional than the ones that
Brown outlawed because they admitted only whites.
At one level, they clearly are not comparable. The system of
state-imposed racial segregation in public education that Brown
declared unconstitutional was designed to ensure that blacks re-
mained a second-class, subjugated race in American society.
Schools established for black males, in contrast, are not designed
to subjugate whites or deny them first-class citizenship. Rather,
they address what most would acknowledge is the critical plight of
young black males in urban America. The premise of the theory is
that "one of the most obvious psychosocial deficits in the environ-
ment of innercity black boys is the lack of consistent, positive, lit-
erate, black male role models."4
At another level, however, our history counsels us to be wary of
any racial classifications. For that reason, the Supreme Court has
mandated that any use of racial criteria by government must be for
the purpose of achieving a compelling interest and must be neces-
sary to achieve that purpose.4' Dual school systems under segrega-
tion failed that test because maintaining segregation of the races
did not constitute a compelling government interest.42 All-black
academies, in contrast, concededly are designed to meet a compel-
ling interest-saving black males from educational and social dis-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (striking
down all-male academies on both state and federal grounds).
39. Carol Innerst, School Geared to Black Boys Attracts Girls, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1991, at A3.
40. Spencer H. Holland, A Radical Approach to Educating Young Black Males, EDUC.
WK., Mar. 25, 1987, at 24, 24.
41. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
42. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
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aster.43 However, the case has not been made persuasively that this
is an interest that necessarily requires the exclusion of whites.
The fact that the school district might be able to achieve its
goals more efficiently employing a racially exclusive approach is no
justification for such a system. Expedience cannot legitimize racial
segregation. Even taking the proponents of all-black academies at
their word, there is little evidence to support the view that mentor-
ing, counselling, extended school days, small classes, and a curricu-
lum that gives proper recognition to the contributions of blacks to
American society, will improve black male educational and social
functioning only in a racially segregated setting. Such an enriched
educational environment is likely to produce positive effects irre-
spective of the racial setting.
Proponents may contend that only experimentation will deter-
mine the effectiveness of such programs. Racial classifications,
however, are not proper subjects for experimentation. Of course, in
many urban settings, the likelihood that whites will be enrolled in
center city schools and thereby be displaced to accommodate the
all-black academies, is slim. Similarly, whites likely will not apply
to attend such schools. Under these circumstances, as a practical
matter, school districts can set up programs for all-black student
bodies without imposing any bar to whites.
Proposals to create all-black male academies have attracted ad-
herents largely in those districts where a number of schools in the
center city, as in Milwaukee, cannot feasibly be desegregated.
Under these circumstances, it is hard to fault black parents and
sympathetic school officials who do not believe that black male
students can await the integration millennium. Consequently, they
have joined forces to develop a structure that they hope will save
their sons. Such approaches clearly reflect disenchantment with
the Brown integrative ideal and may be educationally misguided.
However, to the extent that whites and females may participate,
the programs would not appear to violate constitutional limits."'
43. In Milwaukee, for example, 50% of the black males entering high school do not gradu-
ate. Dunkel, supra note 33, at El. Black males make up 27.6% of the school population but
account for half of all students suspended. Id. In 1990, out of 5,716 black males in the city's
public high schools, only 125 had grade point averages above 3.0. Id.
44. Some commentators have raised questions not only about the constitutionality of all-
black male academies but also of the "Afrocentric" curriculum that such schools offer, an
[Vol. 34:53
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IV. HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
NAACP lawyers prepared for their ultimate assault on the "sep-
arate but equal" doctrine in Brown by challenging successfully the
exclusion of blacks from all-white graduate and professional
schools.45 Indeed, it was in one of those earlier cases that the Su-
preme Court acknowledged the "intangible" inequality caused by
segregation that would figure so prominently in its 1954 decision.46
The Court made clear shortly after Brown 1I, 47 the desegregation
implementation decision in 1955, that the concept of "all deliberate
speed '48 had no application to higher education desegregation.49
Consequently, efforts by blacks to enroll in previously all-white
colleges and universities during the late 1950s and early 1960s
found support in the courts, as well as in the executive branch. In
a few instances, the government even called out troops to ensure
the admission of blacks. 50
Meanwhile, almost no attention was being given to the fact that
southern and border states were continuing to operate dual sys-
tems of higher education. This arrangement was dictated, in large
part, by the federal government's promotion in 1862, under the
First Morrill Act,5' of state land grant colleges for whites and then,
in 1890, under the Second Morrill Act,52 parallel institutions for
blacks. Thereafter states systematically discriminated against
black institutions in the allocation of funds for a period that ex-
tended well beyond 1954.13
issue that this Article does not address. For a comprehensive treatment of that issue, see
Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285 (1992).
45. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCA-
TION, 1925-1950, at 105-37 (1987).
46. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950).
47. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
48. Id. at 301.
49. Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 413-14 (1956).
50. See JAMES H. MEREDITH, THREE YEARS IN MISSISSIPPI 208-10 (1966).
51. Ch. 130, § 4, 12 Stat. 503, 504 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-305, 307-
308 (1988)).
52. Ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (1890) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321-326, 328 (1988)).
53. For a general review of the Morrill Acts and underfunding of historically black insti-
tutions, see Gil Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public
College: The Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L. REv. 29, 40-64 (1987).
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The historically black institutions, as a group, nevertheless,
achieved remarkable success educating students from segregated
and inferior secondary schools. They developed programs that pro-
vided their students with instruction and nurturing sufficient to
prepare them to function effectively in society after graduation. In
many cases, their graduates have pursued graduate and profes-
sional training at prestigious universities in the North and West.
5 4
Early attempts to challenge dual systems of higher education
produced court orders that seemed to embrace a "freedom of
choice" approach. 5 State officials successfully argued that college
students were not assigned to institutions, but rather, were free to
select a college or university based upon considerations of curricu-
lum, location, cost, and admissions requirements. Consequently, as
long as states did not preclude students from attending an institu-
tion because of their race, the courts determined that dual systems
did not offend the Constitution.5"
In the early 1970s, however, black plaintiffs initiated litigation in
Adams v. Richardson,57 charging federal officials with illegally pro-
viding funds to states that maintained dual systems of higher edu-
cation."8 As a result of this suit, the court ordered the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)-and later the Depart-
ment of Education-to launch an enforcement campaign to dis-
mantle those systems. 9 Central to that campaign was the premise
that the states in question had a constitutional duty to act affirma-
tively to remedy the conditions that created and perpetuated sepa-
rate black and white institutions at the post-secondary level.6 0
Unlike earlier court decisions, federal administrative directives
rejected the notion that "freedom of choice" was the proper reme-
54. Antoine Garibaldi, Black Colleges an Overview, in BLACK COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES:
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 3, 3-8 (Antoine Garibaldi ed., 1984).
55. See, e.g., Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. Sch. and College Auth., 289
F. Supp. 784, 788-89 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
56. Id. at 789-90.
57. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1165.
60. See id. at 1163-65; Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056, 1065 (6th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 34:53
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dial model.' They recognized that students' choices were shaped
powerfully by the effects of longstanding mandated segregation
and discriminatory resource allocations between black and white
institutions. 2 One example of this was the placement of new insti-
tutions with parallel curriculums in communities where previously
only historically black public institutions existed. These parallel
institutions effectively provided white students with segregated
alternatives.63
Black higher education groups were at odds with federal agen-
cies and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which brought the Ad-
ams suit, regarding the wisdom of pressing desegregation of public
colleges and universities.6 4 Black college presidents, faculty, and
alumni were undoubtedly mindful of the burdens the black com-
munity had been forced to bear during desegregation of public pri-
mary and secondary systems. They feared that desegregation of
higher education would result, at best, in whites displacing black
teachers and administrators, as well as black students.65 At worst,
given the relative inferiority of their institutions, desegregation
might result in the closing of schools, or the absorption of tradi-
tionally black institutions into historically white schools.6 6 In ei-
ther event, institutions important to the black community would
lose their identity, and opportunities in higher education for black
administrators, faculty, and students would be significantly
diminished.67
Despite similar concerns, however, proponents of desegregation
in higher education believed that both litigation and administra-
tive enforcement could increase resources available to historically
black institutions. Reducing program duplication and forcing the
61. See, e.g., Revised Criteria Specifying the Ingredients of Acceptable Plans to Desegre-
gate State Systems of Public Higher Education, 43 Fed. Reg. 6658, 6658-59, 6661 (1978)
[hereinafter Revised Criteria].
62. Id. at 6658-61.
63. See Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644 (M.D. Tenn. 1977) (mandating merger of paral-
lel institutions because desegregation was not occurring), aff'd sub nom. Geier v. University
of Tenn., 597 F.2d. 1056 (6th Cir. 1979).
64. For a full discussion of these concerns, see JEAN L. PREER, LAWYERS V. EDUCATORS:
BLACK COLLEGES AND DESEGREGATION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 188-232 (1982).
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states to locate especially attractive academic programs at tradi-
tionally black schools would also enhance the schools' long-term
viability. 8
It is fair to say that this desegregation effort has not been very
successful. Significant segregation between historically black and
white institutions is still apparent. Since 1973, state officials have
effectively utilized the administrative process to delay meaningful
change. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit dismissed the Adams litigation on technical grounds.6 9
As a result, the federal government is able to decide upon the na-
ture, scope, and timing of enforcement largely free of court
oversight.
Two higher education desegregation efforts, one involving Loui-
siana and the other Mississippi, were severed from the Adams ad-
ministrative process and referred by HEW to the Justice Depart-
ment for judicial enforcement.7" Little systemic desegregation has
occurred in either case over the many years they have been in
court. The Supreme Court recently ruled on Mississippi's higher
education desegregation case.7'
The case presented the Court with an opportunity to define a
state's constitutional duty to dismantle formerly dual systems of
higher education, a question which had produced conflicting an-
swers in the lower federal courts. Some courts had taken the posi-
tion that higher education authorities had an affirmative responsi-
bility, similar to that imposed upon school boards in the case of
primary and secondary school desegregation, to eradicate the ves-
tiges of their dual systems. 2 Like HEW in the Adams proceedings,
these courts believed that this responsibility must be discharged
by addressing a variety of practices that affect students' decisions
about which institutions they attend, such as admissions stan-
dards, program duplication, institutional resources, and govern-
68. Revised Criteria, supra note 61, at 6658-64.
69. Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d. 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
70. See United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1988), vacated, 751 F.
Supp. 606 (E.D. La. 1990); Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Miss. 1987), affd, 914
F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v.
Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
71. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
72. See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 532-35 (E.D. La. 1989).
[Vol. 34:53
RETHINKING THE INTEGRATIVE IDEAL
ance.7 3 Other courts rejected the notion that primary and second-
ary school desegregation doctrines had any applicability to higher
education, principally because college and university attendance is
not mandated by the state but depends upon individual student
choice.714 Consequently, these courts-including both the trial and
appellate courts in the Mississippi case-concluded that a state's
constitutional responsibility ends once it has removed all racial
bars to students' attending the college or university of their
choice. 5
In United States v. Fordice,76 the Supreme Court essentially
embraced the former "affirmative duty" doctrine and reversed the
lower courts' determination that Mississippi had met its constitu-
tional responsibility. The Court found that in at least four ar-
eas-admission standards, program duplication, institutional mis-
sion assignments, and continued operation of all eight public
universities-the state had failed to show that the "policies and
practices traceable to its prior system that continue to have segre-
gative effects" had "sound educational justification" and could not
"be practicably eliminated."7 The case was then returned to the
lower courts for evaluation of the Mississippi system against the
Court's newly articulated standard.78
The Court's decision leaves in limbo, however, the future of Mis-
sissippi's three historically black institutions. Although the Court
acknowledged that "closure of one or more institutions would de-
crease the discriminatory effects of the present system," 79 it de-
clined to find such action constitutionally required.80 However, it
flatly rejected the notion that Mississippi had a constitutional duty
to upgrade the historically black institutions, as such.8 ' Rather, it
left to the lower courts the question of whether "an increase in
73. See, e.g., Geier v. Blanton, 427 F. Supp. 644, 657-60 (M.D. Tenn. 1977), aff'd sub noma.
Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979).
74. See Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1553-54.
75. Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.3d 676, 687 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated and remanded
sub nom. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); Allain, 674 F. Supp. at 1554.
76. 112 S. Ct. 2727.
77. Id. at 2730.
78. Id. at 2743.
79. Id. at 2742-43.
80. Id. at 2743.
81. Id.
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funding is necessary to achieve a full dismantlement."8 2 Given this
ambiguity, the possibility exists that Mississippi will be able to
achieve a unitary higher education system by closing those
institutions."3
It is this fear that black institutions will be the inevitable casual-
ties of higher education desegregation that has complicated the
dismantling of dual systems. Take for example, the ostensibly odd
alignment of parties in the Louisiana case. 4 After concluding that
Louisiana's desegregation plans were inadequate, the federal court
commissioned its own strategy.85 That plan envisioned, among
other things, merging the traditionally black Southern University
Law Center into the law school of Louisiana State University
(LSU), the state's traditionally white flagship institution.8 6 The
two law schools are located in Baton Rouge, only a few miles apart.
That the state opposed the merger plan was not surprising.8 7
However, it was joined by the Southern University Board of Su-
pervisors,"" which viewed the court's order as a step backward,
rather than forward, for black education in Louisiana. 9 The board
claimed that blacks, the victims of the state's history of segrega-
tion and discrimination in higher education, were being required to
bear a disproportionate burden in rectifying that situation. 0 Spe-
cifically, they contended that the merger of Southern University's
law school into LSU's would undoubtedly displace black faculty
and staff and curtail opportunities for blacks seeking legal educa-
82. Id.
83. Both Justices Thomas, id. at 2746 (Thomas, J., concurring), and Scalia, id. at 2752
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part), expressed concern in Fordice
over the future of.historically black institutions.
84. United States v. Louisiana, 692 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. La. 1988), vacated, 751 F. Supp.
606 (E.D. La. 1990).
85. Id. at 657-59.
86. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 514 (E.D. La. 1989).
87. The Attorney General for Louisiana supported the motion either to alter the court's
higher education desegregation order, or order a new trial; the Governor, however, opposed
the motion and supported the court's plan. United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525,
527 (E.D. La. 1989).
88. The Southern University Board of Supervisors joined the Attorney General in filing
the motion to alter or amend the court order, or order a new trial, see id. at 525, and a
motion to stay execution of the order pending determination of the new trial motion and
anticipated appeals, see id. at 527 n.2.
89. Marilyn Milloy, Black School Fights Desegregation, NEWSDAY, Nov. 19, 1989, at 6.
90. See Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 533.
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tion 1 The court's plan did not envision LSU's absorbing South-
ern's faculty and staff, nor did it require LSU to expand to ensure
against a net loss of law school seats for black students after the
merger.
In defense of its plan, the court took the position that the
merger was required by the Constitution and was in the long-term
interests of the citizens of Louisiana, black and white.2 But for the
state's creation and maintenance of segregated higher education,
the court pointed out, there would not still be two public law
schools in the same city, one white and the other black. s The
court concluded that desegregation could occur only if one of the
institutions closed. 4 Moreover, the court observed that in a fiscally
strapped state, maintaining two law schools in Baton Rouge made
no economic sense. 5
Because Southern University's law school had been denied ade-
quate state support due to its status as a black institution, the con-
dition of its physical plant and the quality of its educational pro-
gram were inferior to those of LSU. Consequently, the court
concluded that Southern's law school should be the one to close.9 6
In response to the Southern University Board of Supervisors' con-
cerns about the desegregation process, the court suggested that the
board was interested in protecting the jobs of Southern faculty and
administrators, rather than in improving educational opportunities
for blacks.97
This controversy delineates starkly the dilemma confronting
proponents of higher education desegregation. The court clearly
was correct that the maintenance of dual, segregated law schools in
one city makes no legal or fiscal sense and that merging the insti-
tutions would require blacks and whites to study law together
rather than apart. But the black opponents of the merger also have
91. See id.
92. Id. at 532-35; see also United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 499, 508, 513-14 (E.D.
La. 1989) (explaining the need to end duplication of law schools in order to end dual
system).
93. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 513-14.
94. Id. at 514.
95. Id. at 513-14.
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. 525, 531, 533 (E.D. La. 1989).
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compelling arguments. Absent the state's history of discriminatory
treatment of Southern University Law Center, the school's facili-
ties and program probably would not be so inferior to those of
LSU. Had there been "tangible" equality over the years between
the two institutions, white students might have opted to attend
Southern rather than LSU based upon "intangible" considerations,
such as the presence of particular faculty members or curricular
emphases. Moreover, there is no reason why Southern's board
should apologize for seeking to protect the jobs of faculty and ad-
ministrators. They too are victims of the state's segregative
practices.
Finally, Southern University Law Center and LSU Law School
have different admissions criteria.98 As a consequence, Southern
has been able to admit some black students who, based upon ob-
jective indicators such as GPA and LSAT scores, would not be
competitive candidates at LSU. Southern nevertheless has been
able to train and graduate generations of black lawyers who pro-
vide competent legal services to poor and minority communities in
the state. Unless LSU ensured that black students whom Southern
would have admitted would find seats at LSU, the merger would
represent a net loss of educational opportunities for black students
in Louisiana.
The Louisiana case eventually was dismissed in light of the Fifth
Circuit's ruling in the Mississippi case.9 Solving the dilemma in
Louisiana and in other states where higher education desegregation
is underway will not be easy now that the Supreme Court has va-
cated that decision. 100 The solution cannot be achieved overnight,
however. It must operate within the twin constraints of constitu-
tional requirements and economic reality. At the same time, it
must address responsibly the displacement effects of the desegre-
gation process and the ironic price that the black community must
pay for desegregation.
98. See Louisiana, 718 F. Supp. at 513-14.
99. United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. La. 1990), vacating 692 F. Supp.
642 (E.D. La. 1988).
100. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992), vacating Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d
676 (5th Cir. 1990).
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V. BLACKS ON WHITE CAMPUSES
The proposed merger of Southern University Law Center into
LSU undoubtedly raised concerns in the minds of black students
about the reception they were likely to receive upon enrolling at
LSU. Would the administration be supportive? Would faculty
members nurture their intellectual development? Would white stu-
dents accept them as colleagues and peers? These are questions
that many black applicants likely ask when considering a predomi-
nantly white college or university anywhere in the country. The
alternative for these students is to attend one of a group of public
and private historically black institutions with proven track
records of providing students with excellent preparation for post-
graduate employment or education. 101
These are not idle concerns. Blacks have always encountered dif-
ficulties in predominantly white institutions, as accounts of the
"best and brightest" of pioneer black students at prestigious
northern institutions attest. 02 They had to overcome both social
isolation and a lack of evenhanded administrative and faculty sup-
port in order to excel. 03 Even though black enrollment in these
institutions has increased over the years, the schools generally have
not succeeded in retaining and graduating blacks in proportions
equal to those for white students. 04
Explanations for this disparity range from the failure of such in-
stitutions to provide adequate financial support to the academic
deficiencies of the students. One of the major variables, however,
appears to be black students' perception of the degree to which the
institutions will offer supportive environments within which they
101. Lee A. Daniels, The Future of Black Colleges, EMERGE, Apr., 1991 at 31, 38.
102. See, e.g., GILBERT WARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: GRACE UNDER PRESSURE 12-20 (1984) (ac-
counting William Hastie's college experience at Amherst in the 1920s). Hastie graduated Phi
Beta Kappa, made the Law Review at Harvard, and later became the first black federal
judge.
103. See id.
104. See Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success: African-American College Student Out-
comes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and Universities, 62
HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 27 (1992). See generally JACQUELINE FLEMING, BLACKS IN COLLEGE
(1984) (presenting a comprehensive study of black students' intellectual development in va-
rious settings).
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can grow academically and socially.10 This concern is not unique
to blacks, of course. Students from other racial or ethnic minori-
ties, public school graduates, southerners going north, and
northerners going south, want to know whether they are going to
feel at home in the institutions they are considering. The stakes
just seem to be higher for blacks.
The number of black students attending traditionally white in-
stitutions surpassed token levels in the late 1960s, largely through a
combination of more aggressive recruiting of candidates clearly
meeting normal admissions criteria, as well as the establishment of
affirmative action programs for qualified but less competitive stu-
dents. This development was not an unalloyed advance, however,
in efforts to increase educational opportunities for black students
and reduce racial segregation in higher education. Black students
on predominantly white campuses began to express concern about
the difficulties of their adjustment, unlike their predecessors, who
usually opted to suffer in silence. With varying degrees of insis-
tence, black students asked that college administrators provide fa-
cilities specifically to allow them opportunities for greater social
interaction than the institutions were affording them.
These requests prompted a range of reactions from blacks and
whites, many quite hostile to the idea of black "Afro-Am houses"
on campus. Some blacks and whites who had fought to end segre-
gation viewed such developments as striking at the very heart of
what Brown symbolized. Some administrators wondered why
blacks had sought admission to their predominantly white institu-
tions in order to segregate themselves from their white classmates.
Whites who would have preferred not to see any black students on
campus pointed cynically to the demands for special "houses" to
justify their support for social groups, such as Greek societies or
eating clubs, that excluded blacks.10
These considerations, even the cynical claims of racists, highlight
the difficulty of defending university support for racially exclusive
social clubs and living arrangements that bar nonblacks irrespec-
105. RICHARD C. RICHARDSON & ELIZABETH F. SKINNER, ACHIEVING QUALITY AND DIVERSITY:
UNIVERSITIES IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 33-46 (1991).
106. See U. of Minnesota Will Not Recognize or Support Group That Promotes 'White
Culture,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 18, 1992, at A34.
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tive of their backgrounds or interests. 1°7 Blacks-only clubs or dor-
mitories are bad social policy in that they reinforce racial stereo-
types and most likely are unconstitutional. Ensuring that a hostile
campus environment does not force black students to terminate
their studies prior to graduation may well qualify as a compelling
interest that justifies the establishment of such clubs and dormito-
ries. As in the case of all-black academies, however, it is not clear
that racially exclusive facilities within the university are necessary
to achieving that goal.
In contrast, administrative support for non-exclusive facilities to
benefit black students is sound social policy. They may provide
black students with a "safe harbor" from stormy weather, particu-
larly for those who are encountering a predominantly white envi-
ronment for the first time. 08 When special facilities for blacks first
appeared on campuses, some sympathetic observers thought, per-
haps naively, that blacks would have decreasing need for such ref-
uges as time passed. However, the ongoing debate over affirmative
action issues-from the legality of minority scholarships'09 to
whether blacks are stigmatized by such efforts"10-and the growth
of hate speech on college campuses"' have surely caused black stu-
dents on predominantly white campuses to feel more embattled
than ever before. Black students should not have to subject them-
selves to undue psychological and emotional stress in order to en-
joy the prestige, rich resources, outstanding academic programs,
and influential alumni networks that top predominantly white in-
stitutions provide their students. "Afro-Am houses," properly han-
dled, need not be the source of racial divisiveness. Rather, they can
serve to promote the healthy integration of black students and
107. See Campus Life; Syracuse: Blacks-Only Group May Soon Forfeit Status and
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1990, § 1, at 62.
108. CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, CAMPUS LIFE: IN SEARCH OF
COMMUNITY 25-32 (1990) [hereinafter CARNEGIE FOUND.].
109. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992) (declaring scholarships exclu-
sively for black students at University of Maryland illegal in the absence of a showing of
present effects of past discrimination).
110. See SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA 111-25 (1990).
111. For a collection of campus incidents, see Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2370-73 nn.245-256 (1989);
see also CARNEGIE FOUND., supra note 108, at 26-34 (giving examples of racial harassment).
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black culture into the life of predominantly white institutions.
Such integration does not demand black assimilation but instead
reflects respect for cultural diversity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Brown decision and the integrative ideal that it embraced
have opened opportunities for black advancement that were previ-
ously unthinkable. Brown also transformed our entire society in
other ways too numerous to recite under these circumstances. As
the four developments discussed above suggest, however, the in-
creasing racial polarization and residential segregation in America
have put the integrative ideal to the test. Concerns about the bur-
dens blacks have had to carry in the desegregation process, the de-
gree to which integration requires assimilation and rejection of
black values and institutions, and the seemingly intractable
problems presented for largely black school systems in educational
extremis, are causing growing numbers of blacks to rethink
Brown's integrative ideal. These are admittedly difficult questions.
Nevertheless, they deserve to be asked-indeed, they cannot be
avoided. They must also be answered, although the answers may
be uncomfortable and disappointing, at least in the short run, for
those of us who hoped that we would see a different America al-
most forty years after Brown.
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